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Prosecutorial Indiscretion and the
United States Congress: Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Independent
Counsel
If men were angels, no government would be necessary If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary. In framing a govern-
ment which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government, but experience has taught mankind
the necessity for auxiliary precautions.*
INTRODUCTION
With the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox at the behest of President Richard Nixon,1 the issue of
prosecutorial independence was thrust abruptly to the forefront
of political and legal debate.2 President Nixon's bold conduct
was the catalyst behind the subsequent passage of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, 3 which provided that independent
counsels would investigate allegations of executive branch ns-
* Tim FEDEiAsr No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [hereinafter
THE FEDERA=IST].
I Kilpatrick, President Abolishes Prosecutor's Office; FBI Seals Records, Wash.
Post, Oct. 21, 1973, at Al, col. 4; Kneeland, Bork Takes Over, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,
1973, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
2 SENATE Com . ON GovE miENTAL AttAins, ETmcs iN GovNmE'NT AcT oF 1978,
S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmn, i. Naws 4216, 4218 ("In response to the public outcry over the Cox firing and the
likelihood of Congressional action requiring the appointment of a special prosecutor,
President Nixon appointed Leon Jaworsk special prosecutor with appropriate assurances
of independence.") [hereinafter S. REP. No. 95-170].
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (West Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Ethics Act].
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conduct. 4 The statute recently received the imprimatur of the
Umted States Supreme Court.'
However, the question remains whether the Ethics Act stopped
short of its goal of ensuring political neutrality in the application
of the federal criminal laws. 6 This Comment addresses whether
the legislative branch would benefit if members of Congress
were investigated by independent counsels rather than by the
Justice Department. Part I discusses the constitutional protec-
tions that may be invoked by members of Congress. 7 Part II
documents and evaluates the history of executive branch inves-
tigations into legislative wrongdoing.' Part III explores the feas-
ibility of two alternatives for use of independent counsels when
members of Congress are under investigation. 9 Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that the purview of the Ethics Act should be
broadened to include criminal investigations of members of Con-
gress. 10
I. OSTENSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
ExECuTIVE BRANCH ENCROACHMENT ON THE LEGISLATURE
The power of the executive branch of the federal government
to prosecute violations of federal crimnal law is grounded in
article II of the United States Constitution." Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has declared that executive branch
prosecutorial discretion under article II is exclusive and abso-
lute. 12 As a result of this broad grant of discretionary authority,
4 See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. - , 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622 (1988) ("[We conclude
that it does not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment
of independent counsels in the Special Division; that the powers exercised by the Special
Division under the [Ethics] Act do not violate Article III; and that the [Ethics] Act does
not violate the separation of powers principle by inpermissibly interfering with the func-
tions of the Executive Branch.").
6 See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 11-54 and accompanying text.
8 See nfra notes 55-111 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 112-83 and accompanying text.
,0 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed ").
32 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing the Confiscation Cases,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869); and United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) ("mhe Executive Branch has exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case ")).
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the destructive nature of the power to prosecute, 13 and the in-
herent constitutional conflict between the President and the Con-
gress,'14 members of Congress are uniquely vulnerable to abusive
exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
The framers of the Constitution recognized the risk of such
executive abuse, and incorporated legislative privilege into the
Constitution as a proscnptive measure. 5 Significantly, the fram-
ers' well-documented fear of legislative tyranny 6 did not obviate
the adoption of legislative privilege. The obvious inference to be
drawn from this is that prosecutorial abuse aimed at the legis-
lature was viewed as a serious threat to the legislative process.
The history of legislative privilege certainly supports such an
inference, as, traditionally, the privilege has served to protect
" See, e.g., F MIn.EXR, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME (1970):
The charging decision has obviously serious implications for the individual
involved. Not only does a decision to charge represent an affirmation of the
need to condition the personal freedom of the accused on his ability to
provide bail, it is also the decision that the accused should bear the economic
and social costs of a trial. That he may avoid some of these costs by pleading
guilty only enhances the impact of the decision. On the economic side, loss
of earmngs and the cost of preparing a defense may be considerable. On the
social side, temporary loss of prestige and position are certain, and permanent
damage to reputation not unlikely.
Id. at 3.
4 See Tan FEDERALIsT No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) ("Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition."); see also L. DODD & R. SCHoTr, Co NGRss AND THE ADmNIsTrA-
TIvE STATE (1979):
In our separation of powers system, legislative, judicial, and executive au-
thority is divided among three different branches. In addition, each branch
is given certain checks that it can use against encroachment by the other
branch, resulting in an ultimate system of shared powers. Explicit in this
conception of government is the expectation that tension will exist among
the branches of government, a tension denying in part from the natural
ambitions of political leaders within each institution.
Id. at 354.
1' See infra notes 18-50; see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 169 (1966)
("mhe pnvilege was born to prevent intimidation by the executive "), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 889 (1966).
11 See, e.g., TE FEDERAsT No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison) ("The legislative department
is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex."); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) ("[Ihe debates of the
Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear
that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense
of the other two branches.") (citations omitted).
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lawmakers from civil suits and to prevent improper impingement
upon legislative power by the executive branch.17
A. The Arrest Clause
Legislative privilege stems from the Arrest Clause and the
Speech or Debate Clause found in article I, § 6, cl. I of the
Constitution. 8 The Arrest Clause provides that "ft]he Senators
aid Representatives . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Fel-
ony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and
in going to and returning from the same." 1 9 Despite the broad
immunity that a literal reading suggests. judicial construction
has neutralized the clause vis-a-vis the executive branch. 20
Although the Arrest Clause has been discussed at length in
two Supreme Court cases, 2' the scope of the clause was narrowed
in each instance. In Long v Ansell,22 the Court held that the
clause does not shield members of Congress from civil process. 23
Williamson v. United States24 held that criminal arrests fall
within the ambit of the "treason, felony, and breach of the
peace" exemption. 25 Consequently, the clause was found to be
ineffectual as protection for a member of Congress facing crim-
inal charges. 26
Today, the Arrest Clause provides immunity from arrest in
civil cases, a common practice when the Constitution was adopted
but one that is no longer extant.27 Clearly, the narrow construc-
1, See, e.g., Note, Executive Targeting of Congressmen as a Violation of the Arrest
Clause, 94 Y sE L.J. 647, 660 (1985).
" The Arrest Clause and the Speech or Debate Clause are both found in U.S. CoNST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
19 Id.
20 See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text; see also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YotN, CoNsTriToNAL LAw § 7.10 (1986) ("flhe Arrest Clause has been interpreted
almost out of existence.") [hereinafter J. NowmX].
21 See mfra notes 22 and 24.
293 U.S. 76 (1934).
Id. at 82.
- 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
Id. at 438-43.
2 Id. at 446 ("[Tjhe terms treason, felony and breach of the peace, as used m the
[Arrest Clause], except [ from the operation of the pnvilege all criminal offenses.").
27 Long, 293 U.S. at 83 ("When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil suits
were still common in America. It is only to such arrests that the provision applies.").
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tion accorded the Arrest Claus&2 eliminates any protection froii
the executive branch that may have been intended by the fram-
ers.
B. The Speech or Debate Clause
The Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech
or Debate in either House, [Senators or Representatives] shall
not be questioned in any othet place." 29 This provision has been
recognized as the only clause in the Constitution that explicitly
reflects the separation of pbwers doctriiie.A° Inaeed, the Supreme
Court in United States v I-elstoskPl acknowledged that the-
purpose of the speech or debate privilege "was to preserve the
constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent
branches of government." '32
Early case law found the speech or debate immunity to be
broad and expansive, preserving the integrity and independence
of the legislative branch. 33 The seminal case for this school of
thought is Kilbourn v Thompson,34 wherein the Supreme Court
held that the privilege encompasses "things generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
business before it. ' ' 35 In short, in the first case requiring the
nation's highest court to interpret the Speech or Debate Clause,
speech or debate immunity was extended beyond that suggested
by a literal reading of the clause.3 6
Subsequent cases, 37 however, abandoned the Kilbourn lib-
rality in exchange for a more narrow and restrictive construc-
2 Id. at 82 ("[The] language [of the Arrest Clause] is exact and leaves no room for
a construction which would extend the privilege beyond the terms of the grant.").
" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
30 See, e.g., Stamler v. Willis, 287 F Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. I11. 1968) ("The [Speech
or Debate] Clause is the only constitutional provision wherein the doctrine of separation
of powers is explicit "), vacated, 393 U.S. 407 (1969).
3, 442 U.S. 477 (1979), aff'd sub nom., Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
32 d. at 491.
3 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) ("Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the umnihibited discharge of their legislative duty "), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 936 (1951).
103 U.S. 168 (1881).
31 Id. at 204.
3 See L. TRiNE, Aimmuc~A CONsTrrrtoNAL LAW § 5-18, no. 6 (1988).
11 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 82 (1967) (Speech or Debate
1988-89]
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tion of the Speech or Debate Clause,3  ushering in a subtle
erosion in the "parchment barriers"3 9 separating the branches
of government. For example, in United States v Johnson,40 the
executive branch was allowed to pursue conspiracy charges
against a former member of Congress, although evidence of a
speech given on the floor of the House of Representatives was
deemed inadmissible. 4' Earlier cases endorsing liberal construc-
tion of the Speech or Debate Clause were distinguished because
they did not involve criminal prosecutions of members of Con-
gress.
42
More recent cases sustain the departure from Kilbourn .4
Distinctions between legislative and political activities were
drawn in United States v Brewster,4 with the latter found to
be outside the speech or debate immunity 45 More specifically,
running errands for constituents, making appointments with
government agencies, assisting in securing government con-
tracts, preparing newsletters, and delivering speeches outside
Congress were all found to be unprotected activities. 46 In Gravel
v, United States,47 protected legislative acts were narrowly de-
fined:
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the
Clause is speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the
Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an
integral part of the deliberative and commumcative processes
covers actions "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity," a less expansive immunity
than the Kilbourn congressional "business" standard); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 501-06 (1969) (Speech or Debate immunity does not prohibit civil suit against
House of Representatives employees).
See generally J. NowAK, supra note 20, at § 7.8.
39 Tim FEDERALS No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison).
- 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
41 Id. at 180 ("The essence of [the] charge is that the Congressman's conduct
was improperly motivated, and that is precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause
generally forecloses from executive and judicial inquiry.").
42 Id. (distinguishing Kilbourn, 103 U.S. 168 and Tenney, 341 U.S. 367).
41 See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
- 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
41 Id. at 512 ("[I]t has never been senously contended that these political matters,
however appropnate, have the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause.").
46 Id.
-7 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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by which Members participate in committee and House pro-
ceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction
of either House.41
Finally, the Court in Helstoski49 held that "[a] promise to
deliver a speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes at some
future date is not 'speech or debate." '' 50
In summary, despite the existence of protective mechanisms
in the Constitution5 and unequivocal original intent to erect a
wall of immunity before the Congress, 52 subsequent judicial
pronouncements have disabled the Arrest Clause53 and greatly
restricted the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 5 4 Wh~ther
such diminutive immunity has a chilling effect on the legislature
is unclear However, it is apparent that any substantial protec-
tion from prosecutorial abuse must be found beyond the four
corners of the Constitution.
II. CONGRESSIONAL VULNERABILITY TO PROSECUTORIAL
MALFEASANCE
Violations of federal criminal law are prosecuted by United
States attorneys. 55 However, as members of the executive branch,
U.S. attorneys face intense partisan political pressure whenever
an investigation of legislative impropriety is undertaken. 56 Con-
,8 Id. at 625.
,9 442 U.S. 477.
" Id. at 490.
5' See supra note 18.
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
, 28 U.S.C. § 547(i) (1968) ("[E]ach United States attorney, within his district, shall
prosecute for all offenses against the United States.").
6 See, e.g., J. EisaNSTm, CoUNsEL FOR THE UlrrD STATES: U.S. ATTORnEYS iN
TrH PotmcAL AND LEGAL SYTmis (1978):
Regardless of whether the U.S. attorney or the department makes the final
decision to go ahead on a sensitive case, and irrespective of its merits, the
individual who brings such a case can expect to become embroiled in con-
troversy. It is exceedingly difficult to dispel effectively charges that partisan




gressional vulnerability to such investigations is underscored by
both the growth and potency of federal criminal law
enforcement 57 and the multifarious roles that are assumed by
U.S. attorneys."' Far from being limited to ministerial decisions
over whether to initiate prosecution, U.S. attorneys generally
are the central figures in the investigatory phase of executive
branch criminal law enforcement. 9 Significantly, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that prosecutorial responsibility en-
compasses investigative duties. 60 Particularly troublesome for
members of Congress is the fact that investigative misconduct
will not bar a conviction unless "a demonstrable level of
outrageousness ' 61 is evinced. In application, this evidentiary
burden has proven most difficult to satisfy 62
Investigative misconduct by the executive branch is illus-
trated most graphically by Abscam, 63 the most extensive inves-
tigation into legislative corruption in our nation's history 6
" See J. HALL, Tir HISTORY AND PIosoPHY OF LAW ENFORcEmcENr 231 (1975)
("[N]ineteen federal law enforcement agencies operatfe] under congressional authority and
enforc[e] a myriad of federal laws and regulations."). See generally W BOFP & D. ScmTz,
A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1972).
11 See B. GEansiti, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, § 1.1 (1988) ("A prosecutor
performs many different roles m the cnriunal justice system. He can be an administrator,
an accuser, an adjudicator, a litigator, and a trial advocate.").
1' See J. EisENsTmiN, supra note 56, at 151 ("When you're dealing with the FBI,
they understand and you understand what a lot of people don't understand-and that is
that the FBI does what the U.S. attorney tells him to do. The FBI can't make arrests
without the authority of the U.S. attorney.") (emphasis in original) (quoting unidentified
U.S. attorney).
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430.31 (1976) ("We have no occasion to
consider whether [absolute mmunity is required] for those aspects of the prosecutor's
responsibility that cast Im in the role of an admnistrator or investigative officer rather
than that of advocate."); see also McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 319 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (court acknowledging that a state prosecutor's role encompasses investigatory re-
sponsibilities), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
61 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Powell,
J., concurnng) ("This would be especially difficult to show with respect to contraband
offenses One cannot easily exaggerate the problems confronted by law enforcement
authorities. Enforcement officials therefore must be allowed flexibility to counter
effectively such cnrminal activity.").
2 See mfra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
63 "[Abscam] is an acronym combining the first two letters of Abdul Enterprises,
Ltd., a fictitious Middle Eastern corporation, and the word "scam," a slang expression
for a swindle or a confidence game." Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics




Abscam was an FBI undercover operation where members of
Congress were approached by undercover agents posing as in-
termediaries for wealthy Arab sheiks. The Arabs were interested
in meeting the lawmakers and investing large sums of money
in their legislative districts. Targeted legislators were asked to
wield their influence to help the Arabs obtain federal grants,
gambling licenses, residency in the United States, and access to
certain real estate transactions. Several members of Congress
were videotaped or tape-recorded accepting cash or securities. 6
Based upon convictions, Abscam was an unmitigated and
resounding success. Six members of Congress, a United States
senator, and various public officials were convicted of bribery
and corruption. 66 Furthermore, every conviction withstood
challenge on appeal. 67 However, the sting operation was con-
troversial in part because the investigation was not prompted
by a specific allegation against any member of Congress. 68 This
point was not lost upon the Second Circuit in United States v
Alexandro,69 although the court concluded that the end justified
the means:
En passant, we note that the Abscam affair has generated a
heavy assault upon the FBI's investigative procedures. Abs-
cam was indeed an intricate artifice, a stratagem of convo-
luted ploys and schemes designed to test the faith of those in
the high echelons of government who are the repositories of
the public trust.70
" For a more detailed description of Abscam, see United States v. Jannotti, 673
F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982). See also How Congress Works: Ethics and Criminal Prosecutions,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTEiLY, INC. 207-210 (1983) [hereinafter CONGaESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
INC.].
.See generally, CONGREssIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 65, at 205-210.
67 See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
908 (1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1007 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
961 (1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
835 (1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1982).
" See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
69 675 F.2d 34.
70 Id. at 43.
1988-891
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Defenses of objective7' and subjective 72 entrapment were wholly
unsuccessful in the Abscam cases, despite the fact that the in-
vestigation's "test the faith' 7 3 premise seems to acknowledge
that targeted lawmakers were not predisposed to break the law 74
District Court Judge Fullam in United States v Jannotti5
was highly critical of executive branch conduct in Abscam, not-
ing that "in their zeal to make sure that the defendants would
accept the tendered payments, the government agents offered
such attractive inducements as to preclude any reliance upon the
defendant's acceptance of the money as proof of predisposi-
tion." '76 Distnct Court Judge Bryant in United States v Kelly"
vas unequivocal in expressing his outrage over the Abscam
7' Under the minority or objective approach, if the police conduct at issue is abusive
or offensive, then the defendant cannot be convicted as a matter of public policy. Whether
the defendant was predisposed to break the law is unmaterial. See, e.g., Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The Government may set
decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime and then punish the
criminal, its creature."); see also W LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRimiiL LAW 423-25 (1986).
See Sorrells v. U.S., 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) ("Entrapment occurs] when the
crimunal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
coinussion in order that they may prosecute."); see also B. GmsoSMAN, supra note 58, at
§ 1.2(a) ("Under the majority or subjective approach, a law enforcement official is guilty
of impernissible entrapment when he originates the idea of crime and then induces the
defendant, who was not otherwise disposed, to commit an offense.").
7 See supra note 70.
74 Contra G. CAPLA, Asc ETmcs (1983):
Courts have developed the entrapment defense to protect unsophisticated
people who could be lured or pressured into criminality without a clear
appreciation of the consequences of their actions. It is farfetched to suggest
that members of Congress were so naive or impressionable that they
could be tricked or trapped into doing something that they were not predis-
posed to do. It was the Congress which had determined that this conduct
should be deemed crimnal in the first place.
Id. at 13.
75 501 F Siipp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that two Abscam defendants are
entitled to judgments of acquittal because entrapment was established as a matter of law
and governmental overreaching violated due process of law), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
76 Id. at 1200. The court added that "[s]tanding alone, the very amounts of the
bribes were 'a substantial temptation to a first offense."' Id. at 1200 (paraphrasing
Scriber v. U.S., 4 F.2d 97, 98 n.4 (6th Cir. 1925)). The two defendants in Jannotti received
$30,000 and $10,000, respectively. Id. at 1184.
539 F Supp. 363 (DC. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983).
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affair, characterizing such sting operations as "offensive, 7 8 and
declaring that "[g]overnment agents, hard about the business of
corrupting public officials who are free of suspicion, essentially
subvert our government. ,,79 Notwithstanding such vocal crit-
icism of Abscam investigative techmques, s0 the targeted lawmak-
ers were unable to exonerate themselves.81
Upon completion of the investigatory process, federal pros-
ecutors seek an indictment before a grand jury, which has been
characterized as one of the prosecutor's most powerful tools. 2
The grand jury system plays a critical, albeit controversial,83 role
in the American justice system. Indeed, in federal court, "unless
a valid waiver has been entered, no person may be brought to
7 Id. at 373.
79 Id.
-0 See also G. CAPLAN, supra note 74, at 3, 4:
[Tihe results of the trials and appeals have not stilled the controversy sur-
rounding the techniques employed in the [Abscam] investigation. While jurors
and voters have spoken uniformly and unequivocally, questions continue to
be raised by defense counsel, commentators, and at least two district court
judges about the fairness and propriety of this operation and, more generally,
about the future use of undercover operations to ferret out public corruption
and white collar crime.
Id.
8, See supra note 67.
See B. GERSHMAN, supra note 58, at § 2.1:
Historically an independent body standing between the citizen and the state,
the grand jury today resembles a prosecutorial agency, possessing an awesome
range of powers, and emphasizing secret interrogation and accusation as
opposed to exoneration. Moreover, the proceedings are closed to all but
the prosecutor, the jurors, and the witness. No judge monitors the proceed-
ings, nor is a lawyer present to protect the witness' rights. Indeed, the witness
has only limited rights before the grand jury. Plainly, the grand jury presents
a natural setting for prosecutorial misconduct.
Id., see also Rejecting Change, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 12, col. 1 ("[lilt is well known
that, as the chief judge in New York once said, a prosecutor with a grand jury could
'indict a ham sandwich."').
11 Compare United States v. Srmth, 104 F Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ("[The
grand jury] was preserved by the Constitution of the United States not only to protect the
defendant but to permit public spirited citizens, chosen by democratic procedures, to attack
corrupt conditions. A criticism of the action of the grand jury is a criticism of democracy
itself.") with Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REV 461, 488 (1959)
("Grand juries are inefficient. Rarely do they fully comprehend their responsibility. Grand
jurors are not trained in the law. Therefore, the average grand juror is unable to direct
questions to genuine relevancies or to form a definite judgment as to the evidence pre-
sented.").
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trial on certain criminal charges unless he has been indicted or
presented by a grand jury -4 Furthermore, the prosecutor's
authority and discretion in this arena are near absolute, and the
potential for abuse is great.85
The telephone toll records of one member of Congress were
the focus of a federal grand jury subpoena in In Re Grand Jury
Investigation, Etc.86 The imbalance of power between the pros-
ecutor and the accused may be reflected in the court's presump-
tion that the records fell outside the scope of legislative privilege.
Nonetheless, a limited privilege was allowed,87 with "the burden
of going forward and of persuasion by a preponderance of the
evidence" 88 falling upon the member of Congress. 89 While the
case law concerning conduct before the grand jury does not
disclose any egregious abuses by prosecutors at the expense of
members of Congress, the aphorism put forth by Judge Learned
Hand is worth recounting: "Save for torture, it would be hard
to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of
unlimited and unchecked ex parte exarmnation.'" 90
After completion of the grand jury proceedings, assuming
an indictment was handed down, a decision must be made whether
to pursue a conviction. 9' Along with many collateral decisions,
the determination of whether to press criminal charges rests with
the federal prosecutor. 92 Accompanying this grant of authority
4 S. BEALE & W BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:37 (1986).
" See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
96 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978) (federal grand jury investigating potential violations
of federal criminal law associated with the construction and financing of a Philadelphia




" See also In Re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1987) (court rejects common
law speech or debate privilege for state legislators where grand jury subpoena duces tecum
is directed to state legislative committee; a more narrowly drawn privilege for confidential
deliberative communications is recognized), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 749 (1988).
91 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
" See infra note 92.
92 See B. GERsmiAN, supra note 58, at § 4.1 ("The prosecutor decides whether or
not to bring criminal charges; who to charge; what charges to bring; whether a defendant
will stand trial, plead guilty, .or enter a correctional program in lieu of criminal charges;
and whether to confer immunity from prosecution.").
[VOL. 77
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is broad discretion over its exercise.93 Accountability for the
charging decision is virtually nonexistent, as the prosecutor's
discretion in this phase of the law enforcement process is not
subject to judicial review 94
A legislator's sole recourse when abuse of the charging func-
tion is suspected is to assert the defense of selective prosecution. 95
However, such efforts have met with marginal success. 96 United
States v Peskn97 may be indicative of the judiciary's perception
of the selective prosecution defense as raised by a politically
prominent legislator In affirming the lawmaker's conviction of
conspiracy and tax fraud charges, 98 the court remarked:
Assuming that the decision to indict Peskin and press for trial
was based in part on consideration of his political promnnence,
this is not an impernmssible basis for selection. It makes good
sense to prosecute those who will receive the media's attention.
Publication of the proceedings may enhance the deterrent ef-
fect of the prosecution and maintain public faith in the precept
that public officials are not above the law 99
While the court's deferential position is well-reasoned, it also
highlights the fact that legislators essentially are defenseless when
93 Id.
9 See, e.g., Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 H.Av. L.
REv. 1521, 1523-24 (1981) ("[Prosecutonal discretion is] the ability to make decisions
about guilt and degree of pumshment without the limits of rules or other constraints on
freedom of action, including judicial review, generally imposed on other public officials
making decisions of comparable import.").
9, To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a defen-
dant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that,
while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against
because of conduct of the type fornung the basis of the charge against
him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the government's
discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in
bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race,
religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights. These
two essential elements are sometimes referred to as 'intentional and pur-
poseful discrimination.' Mere 'conscious exercise of some selectivity
in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.'
United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
9 See, e.g., id. (former state legislator unsuccessfully asserts selective prosecution
defense in tax evasion case).




the charging function is exercised in a politically partisan man-
ner
Congressional vulnerability to partisan prosecutonal attack
has increased due to twentieth century advancements in com-
munications technology Undemably, the advent of television
and radio has redefined the import of the prosecutor's "duty to
inform the public regarding cases which are pending in his
office."' 1 The rise of the modern media has been problematic
from the perspective of the accused, however "[T]he duty of a
prosecutor to recogmze the rights of a defendant to a fair and
impartial trial"''1 may be breached when inflammatory extraju-
dicial statements are made before the television cameras. No-
where is this conflict more poignantly illustrated than in the
Abscam investigation, 10 where, long before trial, the public was
inundated with media reports. 03 Many of these pretrial reports
unequivocally presumed that the defendants were guilty 104 More-
over, much of the media sensationalism was fueled by leaks
from the Abscam investigators. 0 5
However, despite characterizing the behavior of government
officials who leaked information to the media as "grossly im-
proper and possibly illegal,"' 10 the lower court in one Abscam
case held that "neither application of the Fifth Amendment nor
any requirement that we oversee the proper administration of
criminal justice in our court through invocation of our 'super-
10 Foster v. Pearcy, 387 N.E.2d 446, 448 (Ind. 1979) (prosecuting attorney enjoys
absolute immunity for statements made to the media regarding pending cases), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 960 (1980).
101 In Re J.S., 436 A.2d 772, 773 (Vt. 1981).
102 See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
103 See United States v. Meyers, 510 F Supp. 323, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he
voluinous appendices to the parties' papers, contaimng thousands of pages of reprinted
newspaper and magazine articles as well as transcripts of radio and television broadcasts
attest to the fact that the public was deluged with media reports of the Abscam
investigation into these defendants' activities.").
I Id. at 324-25 ("Many of [the pretrial media reports] were replete with what may
charitably be charactenzed as hostile statements and innuendo, treating the defendants'
guilt as a foregone conclusion, iteming the 'evidence' against them, and reporting that
'indictments' were forthconung.").
1o Id. at 325 ("[WMe must, in light of the government's admussion of the fact,
accept the contention that many of [the pretrial media reports] contained information




visory powers' mandates dismissal of the indictments."' 7 Clearly,
the prosecutor's ability to incite the public may be counterbal-
anced by the accused only by publicly maintaining his or her
innocence; the Abscam cases illustrate the likely ineffectiveness
of any available judicial remedies.
In summary, the preceding cases reflect the imbalance of
power that exists when the executive branch investigates and
prosecutes a member of the legislature. The prosecutor's discre-
tionary authority is expansive,108 and the judiciary is highly
deferdntial to prosecutorial decision-making throughout the
criminal law enforcement process. 19 In sharp contrast is the
targeted lawmaker, whose arsenal includes few efficacious de-
fense mechamsms."10 While the same may be said of the ordinary
citizen, such reasoning ignores both separation of powers, the
linchpin of the Constitution, and the ubiquitous partisan political
pressures that accompany investigations of congressional wrong-
doing. '1 '
III. A SOLUTION: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
The blueprint for congressional vulnerability to prosecutorial
abuse is found in the statutory scheme governing the appoint-
ment and removal of U.S. attorneys."12 28 U.S.C. § 541(a)
provides that "[t]he President shall appoint, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, a United States attorney for
each judicial district.""11 3 The language of the statute is clearly
intended to comport with the Appointments Clause," 4 in that
107 Id.
101 See supra notes 12, 61, 82, 85, 90 and accompanying text.
'0 Id.
110 See supra notes 18-54, 61, 71-74, 95-107 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1968).
114 [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cI. 2.
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U.S. attorneys are considered to be "principal" officers of the
United States. The Congress is assigned a consultative role in
the appointment process,' 5 which gives legislators a measure of
control over the identity of their accuser. However, the advice
and consent role of the Congress is arguably of limited utility" 6
in light of the great number of U.S. attorneys,"17 the purpose of
the Appointments Clause," 8 and the empirical evidence of pros-
ecutorial abuse."19
Furthermore, once the appointment is consummated, the
power of removal is vested solely in the President, 20 who may
exercise it at will.12 Thus, with respect to the threat of removal,
U.S. attorneys may act against members of Congress with im-
punity In other words, considering the adversary nature of
executive-legislative relations,'2 the President is unlikely to re-
1' Id.
116 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (A. Hamilton):
[The President's] nomination may be overruled: this it certainly may,
yet it can only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The
person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though
perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his
nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted
by the preference they might feel to another to reject the one proposed;
because they could not assure themselves that the person they ught wish
would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination.
They could not even be certain that a future nomination would present a
candidate in any degree more acceptable to them
Id. at 457
"7 See J. EISENSTEIN, supra note 56, at 11 ("Congress mandated a U.S. attorney
for each judicial district in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and it has never altered the
arrangement. [T]he United States and its territories [are divided] into mnety-four
districts. ").
"I See L. TRtBE, supra note 36, at 246 ("The core concern of [the Appointments
Clause]-concern tied closely to the Constitution's Madisoman rejection of parliamentary
government-is to ensure that federal executive power remain independent of Congress
and of the congressional power base.").
19 See supra notes 55-107 and accompanying text.
, ' 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1968) ("Each United States attorney is subject to removal
by the President.").
2I See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 343 (1897) ("Mhe intention of
Congress [was to] enable [the President] to remove an officer when in his discretion
he regards it for the public good, although the term of the office may have been limited
by the words of the statute creating the office.").
"I President Nixon's "enermes list," compiled in 1971, included 28 members of
Congress. See, e.g., S. ERVIN, JR., THE WHOLE TRifl: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY
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move an overzealous prosecutor who is conducting an oppressive
investigation of a member of Congress.
The solution to executive branch domination and mampula-
tion of federal prosecutors who are investigating members of
Congress is twofold. First, a party unconnected to the Justice
Department must conduct the investigation. Second, this indi-
vidual must not labor under the constraints imposed by the
current allocation of appointment and removal power. 23 The
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act'24 provide a
helpful starting point when considering solutions to this complex
problem. This becomes more apparent when the purposes of the
Ethics Act are revisited.
Many of the justifications proferred for the creation of an
independent counsel to investigate executive branch misconduct
are equally applicable when a member of Congress is under
investigation. The Ethics Act independent counsel system was
created to remedy the conflict of interest that exists when the
Justice Department investigates semor executive branch offi-
cials.'2 However, it is equally apparent that lawmakers intended
to "remov[e] politics from the adminstration of justice.' '1 26
Indeed, the broadly stated purposes of the Ethics Act are "to
preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public
officials and of the institutions of the Federal Government and
to invigorate the Constitutional separation of powers between
the three branches of Government."'' 27 The independent coun-
sel's role in achieving these goals was articulated by the Water-
(1980):
As counsel to the President, [John W.] Dean, [III] drew up a confidential
memorandum "on dealing with our political enemies," and [White House
aide Charles Colson] prepared a list of twenty persons who he thought
ought to be dealt with as enemies on a priority basis. According to Dean's
confidential memorandum, the White House was to use "available federal
machinery," such as Internal Revenue Service tax audits, denial of federal
grants, and criminal prosecutions and civil suits to harass persons opposed
to the Nixon Administration.
id. at 134.
113 See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
'1 See supra note 3.
17J S. RP. No. 95-170, supra note 2, at 4219.
'1 Id. at 4218.
Irl Id. at 4217.
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gate Special Prosecution Force, which declared that "[n]o one
who has watched 'Watergate' unfold can doubt that the Justice
Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting high
officials, or that an independent prosecutor is freer to act ac-
cording to politically neutral principles of fairness and jus-
tice."128
Clearly, the Ethics Act was passed in response to a perceived
nusapplication of the federal criminal laws to members of the
executive branch. Whereas members of Congress are subjected
to a no less improper partisan distortion of the criminal justice
system, it is logical to conclude that an independent prosecutor's
politically neutral application of the law is equally desirable.129
The legislative history of the Ethics Act also indicates that
lawmakers relied upon Humphrey's Executor v United States3 °
in justifying the creation of an independent counsel.' In up-
holding a provision of the Federal Trade Comnussion Act that
restricts the President's ability to remove any commissioner other
than for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in of-
fice, 132 the Court in Humphreys stated that
[t]he authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of
their duties independently of executive control, cannot well be
doubted; and that authority includes, as an appropriate inci-
dent, power to forbid their removal except for cause.
For it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during
the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain
an attitude of independence against the latter's will. 133
More recently, in Bowsher v Synar,134 the Court again ac-
knowledged that government officers do not act independently
,29 Id. at 4219 (quoting WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE FINAL REPORT at
137-38).
'2 But see Lowell, Ed Meese's 'Revenge', Nat'l. L.J., Apr. 3, 1989, at 17 ("The
statutory independent counsel law was passed not to prevent generalized politics from
entenng into prosecutonal decisions but to eliminate one small aspect of politics-the
difficulty of the president's lawyer deciding who in the top echelons of the Executive
Branch would or would not be investigated.") (emphasis in original).
M 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
,3, See supra note 128.
3 Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 623.
Id. at 629.
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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of the governmental branch to which they are answerable1 35
Provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that assigned
executive duties to the Comptroller General of the United States
were held to violate separation of powers principles. 36 Though
appointed by the President, the Comptroller General is remov-
able only by impeachment or joint resolution of Congress.1 37
Thus, the Court, while distinguishing Humphrey's, 38 declared
that
[t]o permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the
laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto.
Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an
officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be
unsatisfactory to Congress.
In constitutional terms, the removal powers over the Comp-
troller General's office dictate that he will be subservient to
Congress.139
Applying the rationale espoused in Synar and Humphrey's
to executive branch prosecutions of members of Congress, it is
clear that federal prosecutors "cannot be depended upon to
maintain an attitude of independence"'1'4 in contravention of the
President's wishes. The resultant likelihood of prosecutorial
abuses demonstrates that considerations of equity, fairness, and
due process militate strongly in favor of expanded independent
counsel jurisdiction.
Moreover, events leading to the historic resignation of House
Speaker James Wright earlier this year14 1 illustrate that Congress
M See mfra note 139 and accompanying text.
6 Synar, 478 U.S. at 736.
"3 Id. at 720.
' See id. at 724-25 n.4 ("Humphrey's Executor involved an issue not presented
in this case-i.e., the power of Congress to limit the President's powers of removal
of a Federal Trade Commissioner This case involves a statute that provides
for direct congressional involvement over the decision to remove the Comptroller Gen-
eral.").
M' Id. at 726, 730.
14 Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 629.
,' Toner, Speaker Wright gives up post to quell House 'anger, hostility', Courier-
Journal, Jun. 1, 1989, at Al, col. I ("Wright's decision made him the first speaker
forced to resign in midterm.").
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has endorsed the independent counsel system for investigations
of fellow lawmakers. By selecting Chicago lawyer Richard Phe-
lan as special outside counsel to investigate the Speaker, 42 the
House Ethics Committee ensured that its findings would enjoy
bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. 14 Therefore, the issue pre-
sented is how to tailor the structure of the independent counsel
to the needs of the Congress.
A. Adoption of the Independent Counsel Regulation
Prior to leaving office, former Attorney General Edwin
Meese, III promulgated a federal regulation' 44 providing for
special independent counsels to investigate and prosecute viola-
tions of federal criminal law by members of Congress. Although
the Independent Counsel Regulation became effective on August
142 Phelan was selected on July 26, 1988, after the House Ethics Committee opened
an official inquiry in response to a formal complaint filed by Rep. Newt Gingnch.
Earlier, citizens lobby Common Cause alleged that the publication and sale of Wright's
book, "Reflections of a Public Man," were improper. Id. at Al, col. 4.
14 See id. at Al, col. I ("[The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
accused [Wright] of violating House rules 69 times "); see also Jackson & Rogers,
Small Clues, Red Flags and Simple Miscalculation By Wright Combined to Topple the
House Speaker, Wall St. J., Jun. 5, 1989, at A16, col. 1:
The Ethics Committee's investigations of other lawmakers had given the
panel a reputation as a graveyard for political-corruption charges, and at
the outset of the Wright investigation even [Rep. James] Myers[, semor
Republican on the committee,] didn't think the speaker had many wor-
ries.
But Mr. Phelan smelled dishonesty from the start, discovering, for instance,
that the publisher of a book of the speaker's writings had sold more copies
than had been printed. Soon, he had concluded that Mr. Wright was a
petty cheat on a grand scale. And for nearly a year he worked relentlessly
to prod the reluctant ethics panel toward the same judgment.
Inexorably, the Chicago lawyer and his staff turned up a mountain of
embarrassing facts, from suspicious oil-well profits to a free Cadillac for
Mr. Wright's wife, that simply crushed the speaker under its sheer weight.
Id.
1" 53 Fed. Reg. 31,322 (1988) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.14) [hereinafter
Independent Counsel Regulation]. Meese promulgated the regulation under 5 U.S.C. §
301 (1968), by which the United States Attorney General is empowered to "prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of
its records, papers, and property." See also 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1968) (authorizing the




11, 1988, new Attorney General Richard Thornburgh recently
suspended its operation 14- pending congressional review of Pres-
ident George Bush's proposed legislation to extend the inde-
pendent counsel procedure to members of Congress.14
Under the mechanics of the Independent Counsel Regulation,
only the Attorney General may decide whether to appoint an
independent counsel. 47 If the Attorney General receives any
information indicating that a member of Congress has violated
federal criminal law, then the Attorney General may commence
a preliminary investigation.4s If, after conducting the prelimi-
nary investigation, the Attorney General concludes that "there
are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted,"' 49 then the matter is referred to an independent
counsel.
The Attorney General is also the sole repository of the
appointment and removal powers. The Attorney General
appoints' and defines the jurisdiction 1 of the independent
counsel, who is vested with broad powers. 152 Once appointed,
the independent counsel may be removed only for "extraordi-
nary improprieties." 5 3
141 See Marcus, Thornburgh Lifts Order on Counsel, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1989,
at A28, col. 1.
1'6 See infra notes 159, 164, 166, 168 and accompanying text.
1" 53 Fed. Reg. 31,323 (to be codified at § 0.14(b, c)) ("The Attorney General
shall appoint a special independent counsel to investigate any Member of Congress where
under paragraph [b] of this section that appointment is required.").
1, Whenever the Attorney General receives information from any source
indicating that either a United States Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives has violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation
classified as a Class B or C rmsdemeanor, he shall determine witin I5
days whether there are sufficient grounds to initiate a preliminary investi-
gation.
Id. (to be codified at § 0.14(a)).
,41 Id. (to be codified at § 0.14(b)).
1-1 Id. (to be codified at § 0.14(c)) ("The Attorney General shall appoint a special
independent counsel to investigate any Member of Congress. ").
"I Id. ("The Attorney General shall define the special independent counsel's juns-
diction and may expand it whenever he deems necessary.").
352 Id. (to be codified at § 0.14(d)) ("Any special independent counsel appointed
under this section shall exercise, within the scope of Ins jurisdiction, the full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of the
Attorney General. ").
M Id. at 31,324 (to be codified at § 0.14(g)) ("The special independent counsel will
not be removed from office except for extraordinary improprieties.").
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On its face, the Independent Counsel Regulation offers to
members of Congress much greater protection from prosecuto-
rial abuse. By circumscribing executive branch removal power, 54
the regulation appears to remedy the Humphreys' dependency
problem.1 5 In other words, freed from the executive branch
mampulation and control that accompany unchecked removal
power, the independent counsel should feel less compelled to
pursue the President's political agenda.
However, such a conclusion ignores the magmtude of the
power of appointment, which is retained by the Attorney Gen-
eral. 56 The effect of this retention is that the President's limited
ability via the threat of removal to control the independent
counsel may be circumvented through careful exercise of the
appointment power. To illustrate, should the Attorney General
select a prosecutor who is loyal to the President and who has a
political and ideological ax to grind, the removal issue is largely
rendered moot.
Certain notable ormssions also illustrate that the Independent
Counsel Regulation is flawed. For example, even if the Attorney
General appoints an independent counsel, nothing prohibits the
Justice Department from commencing or continuing its own
investigation. 57 In addition, legislators who are exonerated by
use of the independent counsel process are not entitled to re-
imbursement for their legal expenses. Clearly, the Independent
Counsel Regulation offers an incomplete solution to the problem
confronting the legislature. 58
154 Id.
"I See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
'16 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
"57 Furthermore, in cases where "allegations involving criminality against a Member
of Congress arise out of a criminal investigation being conducted by the Attorney
General, the Attorney General may allow that ongoing investigation to continue and
include said Member of Congress instead of invoking the procedures set forth in [the
Independent Counsel Regulation]." 53 Fed. Reg. 31,324 (to be codified at § 0.140)).
118 Many commentators have characterized the Independent Counsel Regulation as
little more than a parting shot at Congress by former Attorney General Edwin Meese,
who was frequently criticized by members of Congress and the media. Meese was also
the subject of two independent prosecutor investigations. See, e.g., Barrett & Abramson,
As Attorney General, Thornburgh Pushes Meese-Like Agenda, Wall St. J., Mar. 29,
1989, at Al, col. 1; see also Lowell, supra note 129, at 137 ("[The Independent Counsel
Regulation] should be recogmzed for what it is-a last-mnnute, in-the-darkness-of-right
attempt to even the political score.").
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B. Expansion of the Ethics Act
Application of the Ethics Act independent counsel provisions
in toto, as President Bush proposed recently along with certain
amendments ' 5 9 may be a viable alternative solution. While, ob-
,19 On January 25, 1989, President George Bush established the President's Coni-
mission on Federal Ethics Law Reform, which was charged with reviewing the ethical
standards to which public servants are held. See Exec. Order No. 12,668, 54 Fed. Reg.
3,979 (1989). The Commission presented its report to the President on March 9, 1989.
See Report of the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform (1989). In
addition to making various recommendations regarding post-employment restrictions,
financial disclosure, and the general structure of federal ethics regulation, the Commis-
sion also recommended that the independent counsel be extended to the Congress. Id.
at 111.
In contrast to the analysis presented in this Comment, the rationale given for the
Commission's recommendation was the possibility that members of Congress were break-
ing the law and going unpunished. For example, one reason given was that "[e]xecutive
branch investigations of [members of Congress] are inherentiy awkward, and there is at
least the prospect that intensive investigations may be discouraged by the risk of of-
fending the target of the investigation." Id. at 112. A second reason given was that
extension of the independent counsel to the Congress "could heighten the motivatibn of
Congress to police itself diligently and could strengthen public confidence in the integrity
of the legislative branch." Id.
On April 12, 1989, President Bush, seeking to incorporate many of the Commis,
sion's recommendations, submitted to Congress for review the Government-Wide Ethics
Act bf 1989 [hereinafter "Government-Wide Act"]. See Lauter & Ostrow, Bush Proposal
Would Curb Special Prosecutor Powers, L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 1989, § 1, at 1, dol. 5.
Section 402 of the Government-Wide Act amends 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) by adding a section
that extends the independent counsel system to "any Member of Congress, Delegate to
Congress or Resident Commissioner to Congress." The Government-Wide Act also
proposes chdnges in the current procedures related to appointment, removal, and defining
the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction. The effect of these changes is to
fortify the executive's control over the independent counsel, which would eliminate many
of the benefits that expanded independent counsel jurisdiction offers to members of
Congress. See infra notes 164; 166, 168.
However, one change that would help protect both members of Congress and
executive branch personnel is found in § 405(0 of the Government-Wide Act. Accordinj
to this proposal, 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) will be amended such that, before his oi her
office is terminated, the independent counsel must file with the court "a statement
indicating the cases brought by the independent counsel arid the disposition of these
eases." Government-Wide Act at § 405(0. This would replace the requirement that ihe
independent counsel file a report "setting forth fully and completely a description (f
the work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all cases brought, and
the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such
independent counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B). Because the court may release this
report to the public, the unindicted target of an independent counsel investigation is
treated more equitably under President Bush's proposal. That is, by not requiring A
detailed analysis of the independent counsel's reasons for not prosecuting certain matters,
the proposed amendment is more protective of the target's reputation.
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viously, this result can be achieved by passing legislation, at least
one commentator argues that the Ethics Act already provides
for independent counsels to investigate members of Congress. 16°
Several provisions of the Ethics Act and the Independent
Counsel Regulation are largely identical. Among these provisions
are the Attorney General's responsibility for both preliminary
investigations 161 and deciding whether the appointment of an
independent counsel is warranted.' 62 Likewise, the independent
counsel is vested with broad prosecutorial powers, 63 and limited
power of removal may be exercised by the Attorney General. 64
6 Under the existing statute, if an attorney general truly believes there is a
case involving a member of Congress in which there are real political
perception issues, he or she can invoke the statutory independent counsel
and ask the neutral, three-member court to appoint a counsel who will
then operate in the system already established The statute expressly
provides that the attorney general can invoke the preliminary investigation
procedures, leading up to the appointment of an independent counsel when
he or she "determines that an investigation or prosecution [by] the
Department of Justice may result in a personal, financial, or political
conflict of interest."
Lowell, supra note 129, at 37 (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(2)).
While this interpretation of the statute may be correct, it is also true that the quoted
provision does not require the Attorney General to use the statutory procedure. Rather,
the Attorney General "may" conduct such a preliminary investigation with respect to
persons outside the executive branch. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(c). Therefore, this provision
is unlikely to remedy the problem of prosecutonal abuse directed at the legislature.
161 See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a); 53 Fed. Reg. 31,323 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.14
(a, b)).
162 See 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1); 53 Fed. Reg. 31,323 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §
0.14(c)).
'-3 See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) ("[Ain independent counsel shall have full
power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions
and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer
or employee of the Department of Justice. "); 53 Fed. Reg. 31,323 (to be codified
at 28 C.F.R. § 0.14(d)).
164 The removal language used in the Independent Counsel Regulation and the
Ethics Act is not identical, although the import appears the same. Grounds for removal
under the Ethics Act are "good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any
other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's
duties." 28 U.S.C. at § 596(a)(1). Under the Independent Counsel Regulation, removal
is warranted for "extraordinary improprieties." 53 Fed. Reg. 31,324 (to be codified at
28 C.F.R. § 0.14(g)).
The Government-Wide Act seeks to strengthen the Attorney General's role m
terminating the independent counsel. That is, when the independent counsel's investi-
gation is sufficiently complete to allow the Justice Department to take over and perform
any phase of the investigation or prosecution that remains, the Ethics Act provides that
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However, despite these similarities, the Ethics Act and the In-
dependent Counsel Regulation are fundamentally different.
Under the Ethics Act, if the Attorney General determines
that independent counsel appointment is necessary, application
is made to a special division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.16 5 Upon receipt of
the application, the special division is charged with the appoint-
ment of the independent counsel.es Sole responsibility for ap-
pointment is vested thereby in the judiciary, a theoretically neutral
party, rather than the executive branch, as in the Independent
Counsel Regulation. 167 In addition, again the judiciary, rather
than the executive branch, defines the jurisdiction of the inde-
pendent counsel. 68 In summary, under the Ethics Act, the ex-
ecutive branch must relinquish actual control over the independent
counsel.
Further, unlike the Independent Counsel Regulation,16 9
"[w]henever a matter is in the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an
independent counsel or has been accepted by an independent
counsel' ' 170 under the Ethics Act, "the Department of Justice,
the Attorney General, and all other officers and employees of
"[t]he division of the court, either on its own motion or upon the request of the
Attorney General, may terminate" the independent counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2)
(emphasis added). The Government-Wide Act provides, under identical circumstances,
that the court, "upon the request of the Attorney General, shall" terminate the inde-
pendent counsel. See Government-Wide Act at § 407(a) (emphasis added).
165 See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) ("Upon receipt of an application under § 592(c), the
division of the court shall appoint an appropnate independent counsel. ").
I" Id. The Ethics Act does not limit in any way the court's ability to select an
individual to hold the office of independent counsel. Conversely, the Government-Wide
Act, in amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(b)(1), (e), mandates that the appointee be chosen
"from a list submitted by the Attorney General of 15 persons chosen from among past
and present United States Attorneys and experienced career prosecutors." See Govern-
ment-Wide Act at §§ 404(a), (i).
267 See supra note 150.
' See 28 U.S.C. at § 593(b)(1) ("[T]he division of the court shall define [the]
independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction."). The Government-Wide Act deletes
so much of the latter provision as is necessary to eliminate the court's power to define
the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel. See Government-Wide Act at
§ 404(a). Instead, by amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(d), 593(b)(1), (b)(3), (c)(1), (c)(2)(B),
(c)(2)(C), the Government-Wide Act gives this authority to the Attorney General. See
Government-Wide Act at §§ 403(0, 404(a), (c), (d), (g)-(i).
269 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
27M 28 U.S.C. § 597(a).
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the Department of Justice shall suspend all investigations and
proceedings regarding such matter. 91171 Thus, the Ethics Act
avoids the possibility of simultaneous investigations by the in-
dependent counsel and the Justice Department. Moreover, leg-
islators who remain unindicted following an independent counsel's
investigation would be entitled to petition the court for reim-
bursement of reasonable attorneys' fees. 72 This provision is also
not included in the Independent Counsel Regulation.'73
Obviously, the President's inability under the Ethics Act to
control the independent counsel, an officer of the executive
branch, raises questions concerning the separation of powers.
For years after its passage, the Ethics Act was the focus of
protracted debate among legal scholars over whether the inde-
pendent counsel provisions would pass constitutional muster. 74
The Supreme Court recently resolved this issue in Morrison v
Olson, 75 upholding the Ethics Act over the vehement dissent of
Justice Scalia. 176
The Court held that because independent counsels are infe-
rior officers under the Appointments Clause, the Congress con-
stitutionally may vest the appointment power in the judiciary 177
The Court likewise was undisturbed by the President's limited
removal power, declaring that "we simply do not see how the
171 Id.
-- Id. at § 593(f(1). The court has sole discretion over whether the request will be
granted. Id.
73 See supra note 144.
174 Compare Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night
Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in
the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REv 113 (1982) (constitutional) and Lazarus and Larson, The Constitutionality of the
Independent Counsel Statute, 25 AM. Cum. L.R. 187 (1987) (constitutional) with Inde-
pendent Prosecutors: Fatally Flawed A.B.A. J. Oct. 1, 1987, at 47 (unconstitutional)
and Gross, Ethics in Government Act-Major Provisions 'Unfair' N.Y. L.J., June 29,
1982, at 1, col. 3 (dracoman and possibly unconstitutional).
175 487 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
176 Id. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("By its short-sighted action today, I fear the
Court has permanently encumbered the Republic with an institution that will do it great
harm.").
'" See id. at 2608-09. The Court stressed several factors in concluding that inde-
pendent counsels are inferior officers: I. The Attorney General may remove the inde-
pendent counsel; 2. Independent counsels have limited duties; 3. Independent counsels
have limited junsdictions; and 4. The independent counsel's office is limited in tenure.
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President's need to control the exercise of [the independent
counsel's prosecutorial] discretion is so central to the functioning
of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitu-
tional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the Presi-
dent. 178 Clearly, because identical separation of powers issues
are raised when the Ethics Act independent counsel investigates
the Congress, Morrison demonstrates that there are no consti-
tutional impediments to expanded independent counsel jurisdic-
tion.
In summary, expanding the jurisdiction of the Ethics Act
independent counsel to include members of Congress is mam-
festly superior to adopting the Independent Counsel Regulation.
While the regulation has the appearance of ensuring prosecuto-
rial independence, such a result is foreclosed by the Attorney
General's retention of the appointment power. 79 Conversely, by
vesting the power of appointment in the judiciary, 180 and restrict-
ing the executive's removal power,' 8' the Ethics Act provides
perhaps the greatest degree of prosecutorial independence that
is constitutionally permissible. In response, one may rightfully
point out that the Ethics Act does not prevent a politically-
motivated panel of jurists from selecting a like-minded prose-
cutor.8 2 However, while this is certainly true, "the weakest of
the three departments of power"' 83 clearly is less prone than the
executive branch to be driven by the desire to disadvantage the
legislature.
I Id. at 2619.
'79 See supra note 150.
150 See supra notes 165-66.
M8, See supra note 164.
In Justice Scalia raised this issue in Morrison, though in the context of the judiciary
appointing a prosecutor who is hostile to the executive branch:
An independent counsel is selected, and the scope of her authority pre-
scribed, by a panel of judges. What if they are politically partisan, as
judges have been known to be, and select a prosecutor antagonistic to the
administration, or even to the particular individual who has been selected
for this special treatment? There is no remedy for that, not even a political
one. Judges, after all, have life tenure, and appointing a sure-fire enthu-
siastic prosecutor could hardly be considered an impeachable offense. So
if there is anything wrong with the selection, there is effectively no one to
blame.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




Strict construction of the constitutional guarantee of legis-
lative privilege has led to an imbalance in power between the
executive and the legislative branches. 8 4 This relative inequality
has been exacerbated by traditional judicial deference to the
discretion of the prosecutor 185 While the result has not brought
about a constitutional crisis, separation of powers principles are
distorted nonetheless, and members of Congress must face the
risk of partisanship in the application of the federal criminal
laws. The issue presented was identified over two hundred years
ago by James Madison:
It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature
and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the
limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory,
the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be
legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult
task is to provide some practical security for each, against the
invasion of the others. What this security ought to be is the
great problem to be solved.'86
The Ethics Act and the Independent Counsel Regulation
represent alternative solutions to prosecutorial encroachment upon
the legislature. Despite its appearance of fostering prosecutorial
independence, the Independent Counsel Regulation may be no
more than a placebo. In sharp contrast, the Ethics Act would
restrict substantially and effectively the President's control over
prosecutorial activity directed at members of Congress. More
important, only the latter provides "practical security' '1 87 for the
legislature.
Brian A. Cromer**
14 See supra notes 11-50 and accompanying text.
,85 See supra notes 55-107 and accompanying text.
TiE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison).
197 Id.
** Special thanks to Professor John M. Rogers for reviewing previous drafts of
this Comment.
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